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Accurate retrospection is critical in many decision scenarios ranging from
investment banking to hedonic psychology. A notoriously difficult case is to
integratepreviouslyperceivedvalues over thedurationof anexperience. Failure
in retrospective evaluation leads to suboptimal outcomewhen previous experi-
ences are under consideration for revisit. A biologically plausible mechanism
underlying evaluation of temporally extended outcomes is leaky integration
of evidence. The leaky integrator favours positive temporal contrasts, in turn
leading to undue emphasis on recency. To investigate choice mechanisms
underlying suboptimal outcome based on retrospective evaluation, we used
computational and behavioural techniques to model choice between perceived
extended outcomes with different temporal profiles. Second-price auctions
served to establish the perceived values of virtual coins offered sequentially to
humans in a rapid monetary gambling task. Results show that lesser-valued
options involving successive growth were systematically preferred to better
options with declining temporal profiles. The disadvantageous inclination
towards persistent growth was mitigated in some individuals in whom a
longer time constant of the leaky integrator resulted in fewer violations of dom-
inance. These results demonstrate how focusing on immediate gains is less
beneficial than considering longer perspectives.1. Introduction
Bad decisions happen when people focus on the wrong aspect of the options.
An infamous case is when someone, in the pursuit of more, prefers less to
more [1]. While good decision-makers choose the option that offers the best out-
come or the highest probability of reward, this choice is notoriously difficult for
options with outcomes distributed over time [2,3]. In this case, suboptimal out-
come can be a result of failure in the summary evaluation of an experience. For
example, the decision of whether to revisit a restaurant may be based on a his-
torical evaluation of a previous dinner. The overall value of a dinner is a
combination of the values enjoyed from each course [4], but the remembered
value of an experience is often dominated by the peak and the final moments
[5,6]. However, peak and end values do not represent the overall value of a his-
torical experience when it is later under consideration in the context of choice
[7]. Consider a three-course dinner with a mediocre starter, a fine main
course and an excellent dessert. If overall value were the sum of the values
enjoyed for each course, such a dinner would be equivalent to one with an
excellent starter, a fine main course and a mediocre dessert. However, after a
disappointing dessert some people feel that the whole experience of the
dinner is ruined. This phenomenon has been widely observed in qualitative
judgements of both appetitive [8–10] and aversive experiences [11–13]. Most
people prefer the ‘happy end’ of an experience, with steadily increasing out-
come from start to finish. However, overreliance on recency may lead to
violation of dominance: for example, when overall discomfort in medical exam-
inations may be reduced by adding an interval of diminishing pain onto the end
with the sole purpose of preventing the final experience from being very painful
[14]. Thus, in order to assess quantitatively behaviour that violates dominance,
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ation of perceived, temporally extended outcomes to choices.
Perceived value depends on context [15,16], availability of
alternative options [17,18], contrasts to previous or simul-
taneous rewards [19], and for a temporal sequence it may
depend critically on the valence of the most recent temporal
contrast [20]. Here, we bring these effects together to develop
the hypothesis that decision-makers who favour positive tem-
poral contrasts are prone to choose dominated options. We
assessed the retrospective incentive values of temporally
extended outcomes using a new monetary gambling task
with immediate payoff. Human participants were asked to
inspect two alternative streams of virtual coins, whose per-
ceived values were known from a second-price auction. The
participants received payout from the chosen stream without
experiencing the temporal profile again. Our guiding hypo-
thesis was that incentive value is continuously assessed in
relation to temporal contrasts. We assume that perceived
value is encoded by a noisy perceptual process and that
choice is mediated under noisy discrimination of competing
incentives. The development of this hypothesis leads to a
stochastic choice model that can predict choice of domina-
ted options for temporally extended outcomes. The critical
mechanism is a leaky integrator to characterize the competing
incentives. Our behavioural results indicate a distinct over-
valuation of positive temporal contrasts over negative
contrasts when total value is the same. This preference is so
strong that it leads to systematic violation of dominance in a
considerableproportion ofparticipants. The strength of this pre-
ference is indexed by the time constant of the leaky integrator.
Participants with a short time constant are overly impressed
by negative contrasts, whereas thosewith longer time constants
aremore tolerant and theymake better decisions in the long run.2. Methods and material
(a) Participants
Sixty-one healthy male volunteers participated in the exper-
iments. They were 19–36 years old (avg 26.2, s.d. 3.7), with
no history of neurological disorders or psychiatric disease,
no self-reported substance abuse or psychoactive medication,
and with normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Twenty sub-
jects completed experiment 1 and 41 subjects completed
experiment 2. Eleven subjects did experiment 1a and nine
subjects did experiment 1b. Eight subjects did experiment 2a
and 33 subjects did experiment 2b. One subject in experiment
2b did not seem to participate in the task demands. This
subject was excluded from the statistical analyses, but their
data are shown in the plots. All subjects completed a pre-
experimental evaluation before proceeding to their respective
experiment. The participants were recruited to take part in a
gambling experiment and were naive to the main purpose of
the study. All participants providedwritten, informed consent.
They were paid a fixed fee to participate (£5/hour) plus a
variable amount of prize money (£5–15) according to task per-
formance. On completion of the experiment, the subjects
received payment in cash.
(b) Stimuli
In two versions of the experimental task, associations
were formed between visual conditioned stimuli (CS) andunconditioned stimuli (US). The CSs consisted of abstract
figures composed by arranging randomly squares and tri-
angles of four different colours of equidistant hue, each 50 by
50 pixels. Thus, the CS was 200 by 200 pixels. The USs con-
sisted of sequences of gold and silver coins (stimulus onset
asynchrony 350 ms). The coins varied in simulated volume
by scaling a reference coin that had a nominal value of 100
pence (£1). Each coin was presented on a background with
the same average colour as the coin, so that scaling of the
coin did not result in variation in the average colour spectrum
of the stimulus. Following each sequence was a visual mask
composed by scrambling the image of the reference coin on
background. In the pre-experimental evaluation, single coins
of varying size were presented for 350 ms.(c) Procedures
In a pre-experiment, we measured the perceived values of the
virtual coins. A basic requirement for deriving perceived value
from the physical representation of stimuli is to first measure
individual value functions. We used a Becker–DeGroot–
Marschak (BDM) auction [21], in which the participants evalu-
ated 120 different coins presented one at a time on a computer
screen (figure 1a). The participants needed a collection of these
coins as gambling tokens in the venture game that followed,
and their evaluations served as bids offered on the coins.
A £5 budget allowed the participants to obtain a personal
endowment of coins according to randomly selected bids.
After completing the 120 bids, the participants watched a com-
puter animation of the auction, in which their £5 budget was
exchanged into approximately 30 virtual coins. This collection
of coins was their initial endowment in the following gambling
task. The endowment had an expected value of £10, because
the coins were obtained in a second-prize action [22] consistent
with the BDMmethod (for details see the electronic supplemen-
tary material, procedures, pre-experimental evaluation).
In experiment 1, we used an exploration task. The partici-
pants were shown two CSs and were instructed to choose
one freely. Then followed the US, a sequence of silver coins
of varying sizes (figure 1d). The participants explored the
two options in blocks of 20–30 trials within which the associ-
ation between CS and US remained constant. No feedback
was offered. The total value of an option was the sum of the
perceived values based on the pre-experimental evaluation,
and the profit (loss) gained (incurred) from a block of trials
was proportional to how often each option was chosen less
the average value. For example, if the total perceived values
for two options were £8 and £12 and they were chosen 5 and
15 times, respectively, then the profit would be (5/20)  £8 þ
(15/20)  £12 – (£8 þ £12)/2 ¼ £1. In this way, the value of
the endowment could increase or decrease depending on
performance (for details see the electronic supplementary
material, procedures, experiment 1).
In experiment 2, we used a monetary venture with expli-
cit choice. On each trial, the participants were offered the
choice of one of two competing options indicated by two
CSs. They were instructed to first inspect one of the options
shown by a white arrow. Then followed a sequence of coins
of varying sizes (figure 1d ). Then they would inspect the
alternative option. After inspection, the pair of CSs was
shown again and the participants indicated which sequence
of coins they wanted. It was explained that they should
approach the task in the following way: ‘Two pots of
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Figure 1. Tasks (a,d ) and behavioural results (b2c). (a) Evaluations of the virtual coins were obtained by a BDM auction. (b) Perceived value estimated from the
BDM bids (top) and distribution of value exponents k according to unconstrained fit of the generative value function (bottom). A wide range of value function
exponents was observed between participants, with k in the range 0.298–0.846 (mean 0.478, s.d. 0.128). (c) Analyses of sampling error shown as the difference
between predicted and observed state estimates in arbitrary units (arb. units). The grey area indicates 95% of the variation in state estimates, and the green area
indicates the 95% confidence interval of the average value function (left). Subset of positive state errors (grey dots) and standard deviation of the error as a function
of state (middle). Error distribution as a function of state (right). (d ) In the monetary venture games, the competing alternative options are indicated sequentially.
A CS precedes each sequence of coins illustrating the instantaneous values at stake (US).
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pot and then choose one or the other.’
Each pair of options consisted of a sequence of gold coins
and a subset from that sequence presented either decreasing
or increasing. Thus, the options differed quantitatively by the
value of the coins omitted from the longer sequence to produce
the dominated alternative and qualitatively in the order in
which the coins were presented. To vary the salience and
make less obvious the underlying temporal profile, two levels
of obfuscation noise were used (electronic supplementary
material, figure S1 and table S2). In this way, each option was
characterized by three features: (i) temporal contrast (positive
versus negative), (ii) objective value (dominating versus domi-
nated) and (iii) obfuscation (clear versus opaque). The total
value of an option was the sum of the perceived values. One
of the sequences was taken from the participant’s endowment
while the other was on offer from the bank. The chosen pot
would go back into the endowment but the sequence was notshown again. In this way, the value of the endowment could
either increase or decrease by the difference in total value
between the two options, or they could break even, depending
on their choice and the respective funding sources for the two
options, which they did not know of. The association between
CS and US was constant within one trial only (i.e. new CSs
and USs were used on every trial). Payment was made by rea-
lizing four randomly chosen trials (for details see the electronic
supplementary material, procedures, experiment 2).(d) Apparatus
The experimental tasks were done in an IAC (Winchester, UK)
double-walled, sound-attenuated test booth, and the stimuli
were presented on a 17-inch Dell LCD screen with a refresh
rate of 60 Hz. The participants responded to the task demands
using an ordinary keyboard. Experiments, stimuli, statistical
analyses and modelling were done in MATLAB (Release
rspb
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(a) Stochastic mechanisms underlying suboptimal
choice
The relationship between a stimulus and its perceived value is
given by a value function. A central requirement is that the
value function is continuous, monotonous and concave [23].
Moreover, it is widely accepted that there is a power relation-
ship between a stimulus’s magnitude and the signal
encoding its perceived intensity for many sensory modalities
[24–26]. These considerations make it physiologically plaus-
ible that the perceived value x derived from a reward
stimulus is given by a compressive power function,
x ¼ K E^k,
where E^ is the observer’s estimate of reward magnitude and K
is a scaling coefficient. The critical parameter is k, which
describes how compressive is the translation from physical
state to perceived value. The pre-experimental evaluations
showed that k was between 0.3 and 0.8, confirming that the
value function for the virtual coins was increasing and concave
(figure 1b). The parameters of individual value functions were
estimated using unconstrained 2-norm minimization of the
state error in the pre-experimental evaluation. Using these
data, we analysed the underlying noise in state estimate
(figure 1c). This analysis indicated that state is sampled
under noise with constant bounds except from a floor effect
for small coins, where the error has an upper bound of the
size of the coin. In the following tasks, all participants experi-
enced the same amount of identical coins, but their monetary
valueswere calculated according to individual value functions.
An episode of temporally extended outcomes consists of a
sequence of stimuli E(t) experienced as a sequence of perceived
values x(t). Optimal incentive would be simply the integration
of x over t, that is the sum of the perceived values over the dur-
ation of the episode. However, the bounded dynamic range of
neural encoding of stimuli makes this operation computation-
ally intractable for episodes of unknown duration. Moreover,
under uncertainty people often rely on simple judgmental
operations according to the so-called availability heuristic
[27]. In keeping with these considerations, we propose
that people continuously track the incentive value y(t) of
perceived, temporally extended outcomes in relation to his-
torical incentive. The change in incentive value dy/dt is the
perceived value x(t) experienced in relation to the previously
accumulated incentive
dy
dt
¼ x(t) wy(t),
where w is a weight parameter for characterizing the immedi-
acy of the running contrast on the marginal incentive. The
critical feature of this representation is that current incentive
continuously serves a reference point for the evaluation.
Accumulation of evidence in terms of incentive value therefore
occurs as leaky integration of the perceived values bymeans of
an exponential filter with decay parameter t ¼ 1/w (the com-
plete derivation is given in the electronic supplementarymaterial, decision model, which also refers to alternative
value functions and choice mechanisms).
The leaky integrator instantiates a stable Ornstein–
Uhlenbeck process, which has also been proposed as a model
for sequential sampling in perceptual [28,29] and multi-
attribute [30–32] decisions. It can account for spike sequences
of cortical neurons [33] and order effects [34] in perceptual
choice. For temporally extended outcomes, the perceived and
incentive values are available to the observer throughout the
episodes. In subsequent binary choice, the two competing
incentives are compared in a noisy decision process by logistic
discrimination of the accumulated evidence. This choice model
provides a sufficient framework for analysing choice of pre-
viously experienced temporally extended outcomes with the
potential to account for violation of dominance.
We consider the mechanism in the discrete domain
(figure 2a). The contents of each option are sequentially
observed under sampling noise, and a value function encodes
the observed stimuli as perceived values (xn). Meanwhile, the
incentive values (yn) are accumulated suboptimally by leaky
integration of the perceived values, and subsequent choice is
mediated under noisy discrimination of the final evidence
eA ¼ log (yA/yB).
To illustrate the mechanism, we first summarize the
results from a simulation. We then report the results from a
series of human choice experiments using the new gambling
task with immediate monetary payoff. The parameters of the
choice model are fitted to the human choice data in order to
characterize individual evaluation strategies. The simulation
confirms the theoretical foundation, while the human data
provide empirical justification. The results show that this
mechanism can explain suboptimal choices for temporally
extended outcomes.(b) A computational model of choice behaviour
We simulated choice of temporally extended outcome using
competing options with identical contents. Thus, the total
values in every pair of options were the same so optimal dis-
crimination would lead to indifference. The options differed
only in whether the contents were arranged along decreasing
or increasing temporal profiles (figure 2b(i)). Systematic prefer-
ence for one of the options would therefore not be justifiable
from the total perceived values but from a difference in the
incentive values. Neural signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) was simu-
lated by sampling noise, and sensitivity to variation in
evidence was simulated by decision noise (for details see the
electronic supplementary material, simulations).
The leaky integrator discounts historical values (x) in
the running calculation of the incentive (y) for each option.
This mechanism leads to emphasis on recently perceived
values by favouring the optionwith positive temporal contrasts
(figure 2b(ii)). The difference in retrospective discount between
the two alternatives determines the difference in incentive
value. The less concave is the value function, and the shorter
is the decay, the more is the relative difference in incentive
value (figure 2c; electronic supplementary material, figure S2).
Sampling noise causes nonlinear distortion of the perceived
and incentive values (figure 2b), but it does not affect the
expected value of the evidence (figure 2d). Thus, for options
of equal contents varying only in temporal profile, sampling
noise simply reduces the effect of the decay parameter t
(figure 2e). The specification of decision noise determines the
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Figure 2. Stochastic value coding by suboptimal integration predicts choice of dominated options. Simulations (n ¼ 15 000) in (b,d,e). (a) The state (En) of each
option is sequentially observed under sampling noise (1S). The value function encodes state estimate (En þ 1S) as perceived value (xn). Incentive value (yn) is
accumulated by suboptimal integration of the perceived values with decay parameter t ¼21/log(12a). Choice is mediated under noisy discrimination of the
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able way, characterizing the sensitivity and bias of the
chooser (figure 2d). Note that optimal accumulation of evidence
is given for t!1.
The simulation confirms the expected mechanism of the
main parameters. The value function defines the translation
from physical state to perceived value, which in turn affects
the effect size for the other parameters. Sampling noise reduces
the impact of the expected value of evidence regardless of
whether it reflects a difference in perceived or incentive values,
while decision bias and leaky accumulation of evidence can
generate differential preference for certain temporal profiles.(c) Human choice behaviour
To examine the extent to which preference for positive con-
trasts leads to suboptimal outcome in humans, we recruited
participants to partake in a gambling experiment. The stimuliwere three-dimensional renditions of gold and silver coins of
different sizes presented on a computer screen. To ensure that
bigger coins were always perceived as more valuable, the
value function was continuous, increasing and non-satiated.
The perceived values of the virtual coins were known from
the pre-experimental BDM evaluation (figure 1a). The coins
were used as gambling tokens in a rapid venture game, in
which one of two competing monetary options was always
weakly dominated.
We investigated the competing roles of temporal contrasts
and duration for sequences of coins that varied in size along a
temporal profile. On each trial, two pots of coins were on
offer, and the participants would indicate their preferred
sequence. The options contained varying amounts of coins
(up to 19) presented at approximately three coins per
second (stimulus onset asynchrony 350 ms). This pace was
too fast for estimating and summing up the perceived value
of every single coin; consequently, the participants were
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competing options. We used two different versions of this
game, with implicit and explicit measures of preference,
respectively. The first version assessed effects of shape and
coin position in a variety of temporal profiles.
In the first version of the game, 20 participants completed
the exploration task (experiment 1). The participants explored
pairs of coin sequences freely in blocks of 20–30 trials without
feedback, and preference was inferred implicitly by choice
frequency in a block. We observed strong preference for
increasing profiles and for some dominated options character-
ized by the omission of a small extra coin at the end (figure 3a).
Multiple logistic regression assessed if observed choices were
determined by evidence derived from simple proxies for
total value, such as the initial, average or final values. A sig-
nificant role was observed for the single initial (b ¼ 20.43,
p ¼ 0.0000053) and final (b ¼ 0.30, p ¼ 0.0018) values, while
strong predictive leverage on choice was observed for average
value (b ¼ 2.79, p ¼ 1.4  102149; figure 3b(i)). These results
indicate that the participants were sensitive to the chronologic
configuration of the outcome. The results are consistent with
the hypothesis that incentive value is related to the succession
of temporal contrasts; starting low and finishing on a high is
preferred over the reverse (figure 3b(ii)). The following exper-
iment assessed the extent to which this preference competes
with sequence duration.
In the secondversionof the game, 41participants completed
the monetary venture task with explicit choice (experiment 2).
As before, the participants were offered two sequences of
coins of varying sizes and indicated which sequence they
would prefer. But this time, they would first inspect the two
options with no commitment, and then afterwards indicate
explicitly which one they preferred. The chosen sequences
were not shown again. Options presented coins in sequences
with mainly positive or mainly negative temporal contrasts
like the ones we used in the simulations (figure 2b), either dom-
inating or dominated by the alternative option. Some options
had exactly the same contents and differed only in being pre-
sented along different temporal profiles. While most optionsvaried in duration, they all had the same average objective
value. In this way, we examined choice behaviour for monetary
options with two main attributes: temporal contrasts (positive
or negative) and sequence duration (dominated or dominating
contents). Importantly, these attributes could either be incenti-
vizing the same option or they could conflict (e.g. a long
sequence of negative contrasts).
We first examined choice performance for attributes that
were in conflict. We offered long sequences with decreasing
temporal profile against short sequences with increasing
profile (electronic supplementary material, figure S1a–d ).
In this case, preference for the dominating option was not
significantly different from chance performance (avg 0.57,
t7 ¼ 1.87, p ¼ 0.10). By contrast, there was strong preference
for dominating flat sequences without temporal contrast (elec-
tronic supplementary material, figure S1g; avg 0.79, t7 ¼ 4.3,
p ¼ 0.0034), and there was an equally strong preference for
positive contrasts for sequences with no difference in dura-
tion (electronic supplementary material, figure S1h; avg
0.78, t7 ¼ 5.1, p ¼ 0.0014). In this special case, in which the
attributes were in conflict, preference for positive contrasts
was effectively modelled as either decision bias towards
the option with positive contrasts or as leaky integration of
evidence (electronic supplementary material, table S3).
To examine which mechanism (biased decisions or leaky
integration of evidence) was the more likely determinant of
dominated choice, we presented the option attributes in a
balanced manner. A coin sequence could be increasing or
decreasing, and it could be long or short in all four combi-
nations (electronic supplementary material, figure S1c– f ). In
this case, the average choice frequency for the dominated
option was 0.21 (s.d. 0.15). Choice of the dominated option
was more frequent when the attributes were in conflict (avg
0.29, s.d. 0.23) than when in concord (avg 0.13, s.d. 0.13)
(F1,31 ¼ 19.8, p ¼ 0.0001, h2p ¼ 0.39; electronic supplementary
material, figure S3). The average RT in the experimental con-
ditions was 1.11 s (s.d. 0.28 s), with no significant differences
between conditions. The average total value of the chosen
options was £7.23 (s.d. £1.07), whereas for unchosen options
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chosen, an average profit of £2.10 (s.d. £1.00) was gained,
whereas the average loss for bad choices was £1.77 (s.d.
£0.95). After the experiment, most participants reported a ten-
dency to have classified the coins roughly in size (e.g. small or
large; see the electronic supplementary material, response
strategies). They typically revealed to have looked for the
options with most large coins while trying to ignore the appar-
ent temporal profile. Still, substantial direct loss was incurred
in this situation, in which profit maximization depended
entirely on sequence duration, with the temporal contrasts
merely providing supporting or conflicting incentive.1 33
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Figure 5. Leaky accumulation of evidence causes preference for dominated
choice options. (a) Normalized likelihood surface for decay (t0) and slope (B0)
in one subject. The orthogonal bars at the peak mark the Hessian; also shown
is the posterior mean by the blue dot. (b) Distribution of the decay parameter
for all subjects. (c) The scale of dominated choices ordered by (i) propensity
and (ii) relationship between dominated choice and decay estimates. Cases in
which t0 ¼ Inf were excluded in the calculation of the correlation. Including
these cases, Spearman rank correlation was r2 ¼ 0.551 (p ¼ 1.04  1026).(d) A model of human choice behaviour in rapid
monetary judgement
The generative model was fitted to the choice data to investi-
gate the involvement of decision biases and evidence decay.
The perceived values of each sequence were calculated
according to error-free individual value functions estimated
from the pre-experimental auction. Evidence was derived
according to each model, and parameter estimates were
obtained by maximizing the likelihood of the choice data
given the model’s evidence (figure 5a). We examined effects
of bias for the option first inspected (b1), of bias for positive
contrasts (bþ) and of leaky integration decay (t). We used six
separate models implementing decay and biases in a 2  3
factorial way (decay/no decay (t)  no bias/primacy (b1)/
positive contrasts (bþ)). All models include as a free
parameter the inverse temperature (B) of the stochastic
decision process, so in total the models had 1–3 free par-
ameters (t, b, B). We fitted all six models and report the
number of participants (n ) in whom the different models pro-
vided the best fit according to the Akaike information
criterion (electronic supplementary material, figure S5). The
null model (no decay, no bias) was best in five participants.
The most successful model (n ¼ 13) was the bias-free leakyintegrator that captures evidence suboptimally by favouring
a succession of positive contrasts. Second most successful
(n ¼ 8) was the model with bias for positive contrasts. Eight
participants accumulated evidence optimally, leading to t
!1. The average decay in the remainder was 12.2 s (s.d.
8.5 s; figure 5b). When the models are compared at the
group level, the best model was the bias-free leaky integrator
(mean group AIC difference of five compared with the null
rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org
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integration of the perceived values leads to better sensitivity
to variation in evidence compared with non-leaky integration
(figure 4b,c). These results depend in noway on qualitative jud-
gement of the choices; they are simply the best statistics to
describe the observed behaviour. Even so, there was a strong
negative correlation between the decay factor and domina-
ted choice score (r2 ¼ 0.57, p ¼ 0.00002; figure 5c; electronic
supplementary material, figure S4). Dominated choice for
participants who accumulated evidence suboptimally was
0.24 compared with 0.099 (t30 ¼ 2.6, p ¼ 0.014) for those in
whom t!1. While there was no significant correlation
between value function exponent and behaviour,model fitness
and parameter estimates depended critically on the individual
value functions (electronic supplementary material, figure S6).
Thus, a decay factor t that discounts the perceived values is the
most probable mechanism to underlie the systematic choice of
dominated options in these experiments.1417664. Discussion
This study shows that preference for dominated monetary
options of temporally extended outcomes occurs as a result of
suboptimal accumulation of evidence. When people fail to
appreciate the extended value of an experienced sequence of
outcomes theymay later choose a dominated option. Systematic
bad decisions in our rapid gambling task are therefore the after-
math of a misrepresentation of historical values leading to
overvaluation of recently perceived values. While order effects
in decision-making [35,36] and evidence accumulation [37,38]
classically include both recency and primacy, we observed no
role for primacy-based evidence weighting in retrospective
evaluation. Violation of dominance has also been reported in
predicted preferences for future rewards [39–44]. However,
since retrospective valuations differ distinctly fromhypothetical
future outcomes, we have restricted our investigation to experi-
enced past outcomes and focused on incentive-compatible
representations of perceived value. Although previous studies
have suggested that humans and other animals are generally
optimal decision-makers [45,46], our data demonstrate that
many people systematically prefer lesser-valued options invol-
ving successive growth over better options with decreasing
temporal profiles. Our choice model shows that the critical
underlying mechanism is leaky integration of the perceived
values. It favours recency through robust preference for succes-
sive positive contrasts and aversion to negative contrasts. This
disadvantageous inclination towards persistent growth was
effectively characterized in two ways: either directly as the pro-
portion of dominated choices (figure 5c(i)) and the associated
premium incurred (figure 4a), or indirectly as decision bias
and short time constants in the accumulation of evidence pre-
dicting choice behaviour. Together, these results provide a
controlled account for violation of dominance in perceived,
temporally extended outcomes and demonstrate in a formal
manner how focusing on immediate gain is less beneficial
than considering longer perspectives.(a) Mechanisms underlying dominated choice
Sensory noise interferes with the initial encoding of stimulus
magnitude prior to evaluation. Likewise, leaky integration of
value is a mechanism at the level of evidence accumulation.By contrast, decision bias is related to interpretation of
evidence. We discuss these mechanisms separately.
The first mechanism is inaccurate sampling of the state
that represents the options. Sensory noise causes stochastic
misrepresentation of the perceived values. Our simulations
show that the distortion of evidence caused by sensory
noise is symmetric around the expected value. Sensory
noise may lead decision-makers astray by incentivizing an
option of lesser value, but just as often it may boost evidence
for the option that was better anyway. Thus, sensory noise
does not generate systematic preference reversals or impede
rational decision-making for temporally extended outcomes
in any systematic way.
The second mechanism to consider is decision bias (i.e.
the expected value of decision noise). In this case, the internal
representation of evidence for the options feeds a decision
process that penalizes evidence for a particular option, for
example one with a bad end. Our behavioural data show
that decision bias is sometimes a plausible mechanism to
model violation of dominance. In those cases, the decision-
maker may even have access to the fact that evidence is in
favour of the unpreferred option, while all the same they
commit to the alternative in a biased decision. Consider the
inner voice of the biased decision-maker arguing: ‘Option B
seemed better, but I really like option A, which ended so
well.’ The biased decision-maker allows option B to seem
better to a certain extent and still choose option A with the
happy end. Thus, decision bias is a plausible mechanism in
some choosers, perhaps acting according to the availability
heuristic [27].
The third mechanism we examined was suboptimal
accumulation of evidence. Leaky integration of value occurs
as a result of contrast-guided evaluation, and our simulations
show that leaky integration of perceived values will lead to
evidence in favour of positive contrasts (figure 2b). Moreover,
the effect of a sequence’s duration on its incentive value is
diminished due to the leak. Thus, it is a sufficient mechanism
for explaining preference for dominated options with an
increasing temporal profile. This mechanism represents an
extension of the ‘end rule’, according to which the final
value in a sequence assumes an overriding role over historical
values [47]. To illustrate the difference from biased decisions,
the inner voice now argues: ‘Option A seemed better overall
although option B was longer.’ The unbiased decision-maker
neglects duration [9], because he is so favourably impressed
by the succession of positive contrasts. The human choice
data were consistent with this mechanism.
Leaky integration of perceived values and decision biases
are independent mechanisms. While the former implements
the accumulation of evidence, decision bias is the amount
of evidence to the contrary that the decision-maker allows
when committing to a choice. Therefore, the two mechanisms
may coexist, as also seen in three participants who exhibited
leaky integration of evidence along with decision bias
towards the option first inspected (electronic supplementary
material, figure S5). Overall, violation of dominance was
better accounted for by a generative process that integrates
evidence suboptimally via leaky integration of the experi-
enced values than by a generative process that integrates
evidence optimally only to feed it into a biased decision pro-
cess. Thus, suboptimal choice for temporally extended
outcomes is more probably the result of leaky accumulation
of evidence than of decision biases or sensory noise.
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 on June 17, 2015http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from Our results are comparable with the dichotomy of ‘experi-
enced utility’ and ‘decision utility’ [3]. Classically, experienced
utility is thought to be the hedonic impact of the constituents of
a temporally extended outcome. Kahneman and Tversky
observed that experienced utility was not a good predictor of
retrospective preferences, which indicated an option’s decision
utility. Decision utility is largely thought to be the internal
representation of remembered utility in the context of
choice. We have assumed that perceived value is represented
internally in the absence of choice (e.g. during the BDM evalu-
ation), just like experienced utility [48]. Although BDM
evaluations of virtual coins do not represent hedonic impact,
they signify the incentive-compatible values that decision-
makers should integrate in order to optimize their return.
Thus, incentive value as defined above is the critical input to
the decision process in much the same way as decision utility
is thought to have informed the participants in Kahneman
and Tversky’s famous experiments.
Although contrast-guided evaluation can lead to subopti-
mal behaviour in some experimental settings, it is conceivable
that sensitivity to temporal contrasts has an evolutionary
basis. The idea that a positive contrast signals something even
better coming up is ecologically plausible. Thus, temporal
contrasts may be honest indicators of the prospect for slowlyvarying events [49]. Positive and negative contrasts can there-
fore serve as reliable signals for optimizing fitness. According
to this notion, there is survival value in the repulsion to negative
contrasts. Such a mechanism would be critically supported by
the strong tendency of animals to approach stimuli associated
with rewards and to withdraw from stimuli associated with
danger [50]. Therefore, contrast-guided evaluation may be an
ecologically viable strategy for slowly varying events. However
for hasty monetary decisions such as in our gambling task, an
inclination in favour of persistent growth is disadvantageous.
The ensuing behaviour is characterized by a ‘banker’s fallacy’,
which is the propensity to focus disproportionately on immedi-
ate growth in economic decisions when tolerance to temporary
decline would result in more profitable transactions.
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